Answering Heiney Kissinger, who now rears his horned head

Answering Heiney Kissinger, who now rears his horned head

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Subject: Answering Heiney, who now rears his horned head

Date: Apr 14, 2008 7:19 PM

Hmmm.

(HEINEY'S NEW ARTICLE BELOW)


Well, to answer you questions, Heiney, we know you and your banker/CFR/
IMF cabal,
in concert with the Mossad, initiated all the instability in the world
with the
9/11 stunt, which could not have happened without David Rockefeller's
approval
(Enron fraud documents were in WTC7 as well as other SEC
investigations data; Enron,
Halliburton, and Citigroup being Rockefeller entities).

None of these conditions would have emerged without some planning on
your's
and David's part. When you say you want peace you really mean you
want death
on a scale no normal human can imagine. The biggest issue for you
clowns is the
world's population and resources.

Now you create a series of questions, here, and you expect people are
going to beg
for "The New World Order."
"...strengthening international entities"- such as the US-UK-Israeli
controlled
UN.

In truth, you *wanted* the instability about which you speak.
And you got it.
And expect us to turn to you.

When Putin told off Bush in Maine, you rushed to Moscow to repair the
damage, but
they did not believe you. The Kremlin knows the truth about 9/11.

The story you relate here is not the truth.
You don't even mention Moscow.
You don't mention that Japan is signing on with Russia for security.
You don't mention that China, Russia, India and Brazil are *an*
entity.
You don't mention that the Caspian Littoral states will defend each
other, including
Russia.
You don't mention how furious Russia is over the fake Eastern European
forward
bases and over Serbia- who are Russians, genetically.
You don't mention that the Swiss told Bush to buzz off over their deal
with
Iran.
You don't mention Indian Railways in Iran.
You don't mention what properties are owned by Russia and China in
Iran.
You don't mention that you have at least 2 other views for a "new
world
order" that are not based on the violence version of NAZIism which we
call
"democracy."

You don't mention the status of the US dollar and the IMF flippin out
over the
calamities this failed 9/11 gamble created -FOR YOURSELVES. You are
begging the
Finance Ministers of the G7 not to dump dollars.

This is a laugh.

We do not want you, Heiney, or David Rockefeller, or Gordon Brown or
Tony Blair
or AMERISRAEL.

You people clearly suck if you can't figure out how to feed the world,
yet call
yourselves the intellectual elite.

You *LOST,* Heiney.

Go away.

Kathleen M. Dickson
* w w w .actionlyme.org


* w w w .khaleejtimes . com /DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2008/April/opinion April51.xml§ion=opinion&col=

The real debate we need

BY HENRY A KISSINGER (Kissingerspeak)

14 April 2008


THE long-predicted national debate about national security policy has
yet to occur.
Essentially tactical issues have overwhelmed the most important
challenge a new
administration will confront: how to distil a new international order
from three
simultaneous revolutions occurring around the globe.

These are (a) the transformation of the traditional state system of
Europe; (b)
the radical Islamist challenge to historic notions of sovereignty; and
(c) the drift
of the centre of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to
the Pacific
and Indian Oceans.

Conventional wisdom holds that disenchantment with President Bush's
alleged
unilateralism is at the heart of European-American disagreements. But
it will become
apparent soon after the change of administrations that the principal
difference
between the two sides of the Atlantic is that America is still a
traditional nation-state
whose people respond to calls for sacrifices on behalf of a much wider
definition
of the national interest than Europe's.

The nations of Europe, having been drained by two World Wars, have
agreed to transfer
significant aspects of their sovereignties to the European Union.
Political loyalties
associated with the nation-state have proved not to be automatically
transferable,
however. Europe is in a transition between its past, which it is
seeking to overcome,
and a future that it has not yet reached.

In the process, the nature of the European state has been transformed.
With the
nation no longer defining itself by a distinct future and with the
cohesion of the
European Union as yet untested, the capacity of most European
governments to ask
their people for sacrifices has diminished dramatically.

The disagreement over the use of NATO forces in Afghanistan is a case
in point.
In the aftermath of September 11, the North Atlantic Council, acting
without any
request by the United States, invoked Article 5 of the NATO Treaty
calling for mutual
assistance. But when NATO set about to assume military
responsibilities, domestic
constraints obliged many allies to limit the number of troops and to
constrict the
missions for which lives could be risked. As a result, the Atlantic
Alliance is
in the process of evolving a two-tiered system -- an alliance la carte
whose capability
for common action does not match its general obligations. Over time,
one of two
adaptations must take place: either a redefinition of the general
obligations or
a formal elaboration of a two-tiered system in which political
obligations and military
capabilities are harmonised. This might be accomplished by assigning
out-of-area
projects to a European reaction force, which would then create an ad
hoc alliance
of the willing.

While the traditional role of the state in Europe is diminished by the
choice of
its governments, the declining role of the state in the Middle East is
inherent
in the way they were founded. The successor states of the Ottoman
Empire were established
by the victorious powers at the end of the First World War. Unlike the
European
states, their borders did not reflect ethnic principles or linguistic
distinctiveness
but the balances achieved by the European powers in their contests
outside the region.

Today it is radical Islam that threatens the already brittle state
structure via
a fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran as the basis of a
universal political
organisation. Radical Islam rejects claims to national sovereignty
based on secular
state models, and its reach extends to wherever significant
populations profess
the Muslim faith. Since neither the international system nor the
internal structure
of existing states has legitimacy in Islamist eyes, its ideology
leaves little room
for Western notions of negotiation or of equilibrium in a region of
vital interest
to the security and well-being of the industrial states. That struggle
is endemic;
we do not have the option of withdrawal from it. We can retreat from
any one place
like Iraq but only to be obliged to resist from new positions,
probably more disadvantageously.
Even advocates of unilateral withdrawal speak of retaining residual
forces to prevent
a resurgence of Al Qaeda or radicalism.

These transformations take place against the backdrop of a third
trend, a shift
in the centre of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to
the Pacific
and Indian Oceans. Paradoxically, this redistribution of power is to a
part of the
world where the nation still possesses the characteristics of
traditional European
states. The major states of Asia -- China, Japan, India and, in time,
possibly Indonesia
-- view each other the way participants in the European balance of
power did, as
inherent competitors even when they occasionally participate in
cooperative ventures.

In the past, such shifts in the structure of power generally led to
war, as happened
in the case of the emergence of Germany in the late 19th century.
Today the rise
of China is assigned that role in much alarmist commentary. True, the
Sino-American
relationship will inevitably contain classical geopolitical and
competitive elements.
These must not be neglected. But there are countervailing elements.
Economic and
financial globalisation, environmental and energy imperatives, and the
destructive
power of modern weapons impose a major effort at global cooperation --
especially
between the United States and China. An adversarial relationship would
leave both
countries in the position of Europe after the two World Wars through
self-destructive
conflict with each other, while other societies achieved the pre-
eminence they sought.

No previous generation has had to deal with different revolutions
occurring simultaneously
in separate parts of the world. The quest for a single, all-inclusive
remedy is
chimerical. In Europe, the civil society is congruent with the
political structure
of states but not -- at least yet -- with the political structure of the
European
Union. In the Middle East, civil society is being shaped by
transnational forces
at odds with the internal structure of many states. In the Atlantic
area, the challenge
is how to evolve institutions that bring the willingness to sacrifice
for the future
into balance with the requirements of international order. In the
Islamic world,
the jihadists are prepared to sacrifice all notions of civil society
to the pursuit
of an apocalyptic utopia. In Asia, in terms of classical diplomacy,
two kinds of
adjustments will define 21st-century diplomacy: the relationship
between the great
Asian powers, China, India, Japan and possibly Indonesia, and how
America and China
deal with each other.

In a world in which the sole superpower is a proponent of the
prerogatives of the
traditional nation-state, where Europe is stuck in a halfway status,
where the Middle
East does not fit the nation-state model and faces a religiously
motivated revolution,
and where the nation-states of South and East Asia still practice the
balance of
power, what is the nature of the international order that can
accommodate these
different perspectives? Are existing international organisations
adequate for this
purpose? If not, which changes would be desirable? What goals can
America set realistically
for itself and the world community? Can we make the transformation of
major countries
a condition for reliable progress, or need we concentrate on a less
crusading purpose?
What objectives must be sought in concert, and what are the extreme
circumstances
that would justify unilateral action? What is the style of leadership
most likely
to achieve these aims? This is the kind of debate we need, not slogans
driven by
focus groups for daily headlines.
Henry A Kissinger, a former US secretary of state, is considered the
architect of
US foreign policy during the Cold War