some implications of free will

Re: some implications of free will

On Apr 3, 8:05 pm, Sean Carroll <seanc...@hotmail,com > wrote:
> Fred Weiss wrote:
> > Sean Carroll <seanc...@hotmail,com > wrote:
> >>In order for a case to be considered scientific, it has to be confirmed
> >>by peer review, and the evidence on which it is based must be replicable
> >>by all. Thus, the very fact that the case is scientific implies that it
> >>is *not* based on mere subjective experience of individual scientists.
> > All true but it also implies that the belief in the case was not
> > compelled, i.e. that the scientists didn't *have to* reach the
> > conclusion they did, that they reached that conclusion...well...of
> > their own free will.
>
> Non sequitur. In fact, it implies almost the opposite -- it implies that
> they reached the conclusion because they had to, because that is what
> the evidence demonstrates for anyone who looks at it.

Equivocation. You are confusing logically compelling with biologically
determined. They are obviously not the same thing or people wouldn't
believe in nonsense - and they obviously do.

> If their
> conclusions were pure free will, then they wouldn't agree on the
> conclusion in the first place,...

Now you are confusing/equating free will with "causeless". The fact
that scientists agree on many things, i.e.that there is a cause for
their agreement, is certainly not a denial of their free will.
Scientists aren't robots. And of course there are many disagreements
in science, if not on most basics, then certainly at least on many of
the details.

If scientists agree on things because they are (biologically)
compelled to, then what is the status of *the truth* of their beliefs?
All you could say is that a lot of them agree on it - and because they
had to. You have no way of knowing if any of it is actually true
however. The same applies as well to all of your own beliefs.

Fred Weiss

Re: some implications of free will


"Fred Weiss" <fredweiss@papertig,com > wrote in message
news:1175555822.721010.130880@e65g2000hsc.googlegroups,com ...
| On Apr 2, 5:19 pm, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo,com > wrote:

| Oh, right, you didn't have any choice and you were just compelled to
| utter it.

There is a third alternative. I am not compelled to type this neither do I
choose to do it of my own free will.
I do it spontaneously because this is what I'm doing now.
Zen Buddhists call this non-doing, Taoists call it going with the flow.
Tibetan Buddhists call it Pure Buddha Activity.
My refuge name in Tibetan is Karma Namdag which means absolutely pure Buddha
activity.
By destroying such illusions as free will, the existence of an ego or a self
my activity becomes one with The Tao, Nature, the evolutionary process or
Buddha Nature.

Re: some implications of free will

On Apr 3, 12:38 am, "Spencer ©¿©¬" <q...@supahat,com > wrote:

> There is a third alternative. I am not compelled to type this neither do I
> choose to do it of my own free will.
> I do it spontaneously because this is what I'm doing now.

I think you are assuming that free will means "causeless". It doesn't.

All of our choices have causes - and are the result of our natures and
values - but that is not equivalent to "determined".

Fred Weiss

Re: some implications of free will

On Apr 2, 7:17 pm, "Fred Weiss" <fredwe...@papertig,com > wrote:
> On Apr 2, 5:19 pm, "Immortalist" <reanimater 2...@yahoo,com > wrote:
>
> > Science has a very strong case with much evidence developed over
> > decades that the activities of your brain alone is enough to
> > completely explain your subjective experience and will.
>
> Science? Does this consist of scientists who have made these cases
> based on the evidence you mention?
>
> Maybe they just had the subjective experience of these cases based on
> the subjective experience of this evidence, in which case there is in
> fact no case or actual evidence.
>
> Not only that but your observation of these supposed strong cases
> which you think are based on much evidence is equally entirely
> subjective.
>
> Therefore everything you have just uttered on this subject is utterly
> worthless. Why did you even bother?
>
> Oh, right, you didn't have any choice and you were just compelled to
> utter it.
>
> Fred Weiss

Can we all just agree that the debate of Free Will is whether we are a
soul or not. Not whether making a decision assumes this sort of Free
Will.

For what is a decision but an action taken in accordance to factors in
ones environment.

Animals make decisions dont they? Do they have free will? There
behavior is a result of their internal physical states.

Saying that animals exhibit certain behaviors because they are "built
that way" is saying that act because of their nature. Is this so
frightenning? Is it unheard of to say the same thing about me; that I
act in a certain way because I am built in a certain way.
Saying my nervous system determines my actions is not saying I dont
choose my actions. I am my nervous system. My personality and my
moral standings are stored within my neural network. So any thinking
or choosing is because of my nervous system i.e. me!

Now if I want to be undetermined by this nervous system, I would have
to say that I am something else; what I identify as my store of
knowledge along with my personality comes from some other source. And
this something else would have to be something external to the
physical world. The name we use for this is the soul.


So either I am a soul or I am my nervous system. Either way I make
choices. Iff this is not clear enough or you disagree tell me why.

Re: some implications of free will

On Apr 3, 10:22 am, "Cheeby12" <cheebymuck1...@gmail,com > wrote:

> Saying that animals exhibit certain behaviors because they are "built
> that way" is saying that act because of their nature. Is this so
> frightenning? Is it unheard of to say the same thing about me; that I
> act in a certain way because I am built in a certain way.

Well, of course. That simply follows from the Law of Causality - all
action is determined by the nature of (the identity of) the entity.

In our case, our ability to choose (our free will) is based on our
identity as a rational being.

> Saying my nervous system determines my actions is not saying I dont
> choose my actions. I am my nervous system. My personality and my
> moral standings are stored within my neural network. So any thinking
> or choosing is because of my nervous system i.e. me!

But there is no justification for saying that "I am my nervous system"
anymore than to say that the mind is the brain. When we die the brain
still exists, but the mind is gone. A logical connection is certainly
not the same thing as (existentially equivalent to) a neural
connection. You could never say, for example - and I mean *never* -
that a certain neural connection means some belief is true vs. some
other neural connection means it is false. Neural connections, per se,
qua neural connections, can't determine true from false.

I am trying to show the inherent, self-refuting fallacy of
(materialist) reductionism.

But I have no opinion on what consciousness (or free will) is in the
sense of what kind of "stuff" it is - and knowing that is not
necessary for this discussion anyway.

That we have free will is axiomatic, i.e. you cannot deny it without
at the same time affirming it and presupposing it. That is what I was
trying to illustrate in my prior posts. What kind of "stuff" may make
that possible is a question of science, not philosophy. And science
doesn't know.

Fred Weiss

Re: some implications of free will

On Apr 3, 12:47 pm, "Fred Weiss" <fredwe...@papertig,com > wrote:
> On Apr 3, 10:22 am, "Cheeby12" <cheebymuck1...@gmail,com > wrote:
>
> > Saying that animals exhibit certain behaviors because they are "built
> > that way" is saying that act because of their nature. Is this so
> > frightenning? Is it unheard of to say the same thing about me; that I
> > act in a certain way because I am built in a certain way.
>
> Well, of course. That simply follows from the Law of Causality - all
> action is determined by the nature of (the identity of) the entity.
>
> In our case, our ability to choose (our free will) is based on our
> identity as a rational being.
>
> > Saying my nervous system determines my actions is not saying I dont
> > choose my actions. I am my nervous system. My personality and my
> > moral standings are stored within my neural network. So any thinking
> > or choosing is because of my nervous system i.e. me!
>
> But there is no justification for saying that "I am my nervous system"
> anymore than to say that the mind is the brain. When we die the brain
> still exists, but the mind is gone. A logical connection is certainly
> not the same thing as (existentially equivalent to) a neural
> connection. You could never say, for example - and I mean *never* -
> that a certain neural connection means some belief is true vs. some
> other neural connection means it is false. Neural connections, per se,
> qua neural connections, can't determine true from false.
>
> I am trying to show the inherent, self-refuting fallacy of
> (materialist) reductionism.
>
> But I have no opinion on what consciousness (or free will) is in the
> sense of what kind of "stuff" it is - and knowing that is not
> necessary for this discussion anyway.
>
> That we have free will is axiomatic, i.e. you cannot deny it without
> at the same time affirming it and presupposing it. That is what I was
> trying to illustrate in my prior posts. What kind of "stuff" may make
> that possible is a question of science, not philosophy. And science
> doesn't know.
>
> Fred Weiss

I think there is a confusion here that has to do with the nature of
free will. Dale Kelly is basically using his argument to try to argue
for a soul. I will not deny my experience or the fact that I freely
will things. I am arguing where that "capacity" comes from. In terms
of material reduction, our neurological matter maps the world in the
same fashion a computer's innards map the world. It is encoded rather
than just reduced. How it works I dont know but it is not
inconceivable that the living brain could be the foundation for the
creature you see before you. This extra supernatural entity seems like
an extraneous spiritual cause rooted in religious doctrine.

Re: some implications of free will

Cheeby12 wrote:

> I will not deny my experience or the fact that I freely
> will things.

Actually, it is interesting to note that I've read about research where
scientists have found that in many cases, when people believe they will
an action, there is actually a neural signal that sets in the action in
motion a tiny fraction of a second *before* they experience the moment
of decision. There is some evidence that we fill in our sensation of
free will backwards -- that we take the action first, and then our brain
rewrites our short-term memory files to make us 'remember' that the
decision came before the action when it actually came after.

--
--Sean
http :// spclsd223.livejournal,com /
'Hey, take it easy on Foreman. He's playing with one lobe tied behind
his back.' --Dr Gregory House

Re: some implications of free will


"Sean Carroll" <seanc130@hotmail,com > wrote in message
news:D9CQh.182267$ia7.104882@newsfe14.lga...
| Cheeby12 wrote:
|
| > I will not deny my experience or the fact that I freely
| > will things.
|
| Actually, it is interesting to note that I've read about research where
| scientists have found that in many cases, when people believe they will
| an action, there is actually a neural signal that sets in the action in
| motion a tiny fraction of a second *before* they experience the moment
| of decision. There is some evidence that we fill in our sensation of
| free will backwards -- that we take the action first, and then our brain
| rewrites our short-term memory files to make us 'remember' that the
| decision came before the action when it actually came after.

Yes, that's the way the subjective experience of free will arises.

From a very early age my subjective experience was that whatever I did, was
not only right but also inevitable. Therefore I never required any moral
code to tell me what to do.
I remember a Science Fiction story where the protagonist was an "ethical
absolute": I strongly identified with this character. There is another story
called "The Pi Man" where the protagonist was compelled to ballance the
averages in his area. For example if the murder rate fell below the norm he
would have to murder. I also identified with this person. Fortunately there
is plenty of hate and violence about so I normaly manifest love and peace to
ballance things out.
However if I'm in a room full of left wingers I will appear to them as a
right winger and vice versa.

Spencer

http :// www .biopsychiatry,com /asperger.htm useful link I just found.

Re: some implications of free will

On Apr 3, 8:18 pm, Sean Carroll <seanc...@hotmail,com > wrote:
> Cheeby12 wrote:
> > I will not deny my experience or the fact that I freely
> > will things.
>
> Actually, it is interesting to note that I've read about research where
> scientists have found that in many cases, when people believe they will
> an action, there is actually a neural signal that sets in the action in
> motion a tiny fraction of a second *before* they experience the moment
> of decision. There is some evidence that we fill in our sensation of
> free will backwards -- that we take the action first, and then our brain
> rewrites our short-term memory files to make us 'remember' that the
> decision came before the action when it actually came after.
>
> --
> --Sean http :// spclsd223.livejournal,com /
> 'Hey, take it easy on Foreman. He's playing with one lobe tied behind
> his back.' --Dr Gregory House

I think I read part of the same book. The Illusion of Free will was
it? I forget its name but the point being made seemed to be backed up
by experimentation. I do not argue that to will something we must
have a feeling of will. In fact all acts seem to arise spontaneously
from our nature. Its only deliberation and prior thought that makes
it feel like will. If we do something spontaneously, we assume free
will, but experience only an action carried out by us. It only feels
free because after the fact we still have power over our body and lack
the feeling of any alien pressence.

Re: some implications of free will

On Apr 5, 10:36 am, "Cheeby12" <cheebymuck1...@gmail,com > wrote:
> On Apr 3, 8:18 pm, Sean Carroll <seanc...@hotmail,com > wrote:

> > Actually, it is interesting to note that I've read about research where
> > scientists have found that in many cases, when people believe they will
> > an action, there is actually a neural signal that sets in the action in
> > motion a tiny fraction of a second *before* they experience the moment
> > of decision.

Presumably this neural signal also kicked in prior to the scientists
doing the research, so they didn't really decide to do the research.
That's just an illusion. They were really compelled to do it, like
robots.

It is therefore impossible to say if any of it is true.

> I think I read part of the same book. The Illusion of Free will was
> it?

If free will is an illusion that presupposes that we can grasp the
actuality/reality. However grasping the reality/actuality presupposes
free will.

In other words the claim that free will is an illusion involves a
stolen concept.

Fred Weiss

Re: some implications of free will

"Cheeby12" <cheebymuck1234@gmail,com > wrote in news:1175783768.369723.290860
@w1g2000hsg.googlegroups,com :

>> Actually, it is interesting to note that I've read about research where
>> scientists have found that in many cases, when people believe they will
>> an action, there is actually a neural signal that sets in the action in
>> motion a tiny fraction of a second *before* they experience the moment
>> of decision. There is some evidence that we fill in our sensation of
>> free will backwards -- that we take the action first, and then our brain
>> rewrites our short-term memory files to make us 'remember' that the
>> decision came before the action when it actually came after.

> I think I read part of the same book. The Illusion of Free will was
> it? I forget its name but the point being made seemed to be backed up
> by experimentation.

That experiment does not support the implications which have been drawn from
it. First, the experiment (Libet's) required the subjects to report when a
decision had been made. The time of the response was compared to the timing
of measured neural events, which revealed that the events occurred
momentarily prior to the reported time of the decision. But making the
decision and reporting it are two different processes; once it is made, then
activating speech centers to formulate a report requires some time.

Secondly, many processes in the brain occur in parallel in different
subcircuits. The brain, like all biological organs and organisms, is a Rube
Goldberg device. It consists of layers added to existing layers, with newer
layers sometimes supplanting the function of older layers, sometimes
modifying those older functions, sometimes duplicating them. Experiments
would need to rule out that the observed neural events are not events
occurring in an older, parallel system which the "consciousness system" will
override.

Finally, even if an action schema is initiated prior to awareness of a
decision, it doesn't upset free will. The system still has free will if the
action is not predictable from external factors, i.e., the causes of the
action remain internal to the agent.

Re: some implications of free will

Fred Weiss wrote:

> But there is no justification for saying that "I am my nervous system"
> anymore than to say that the mind is the brain. When we die the brain
> still exists, but the mind is gone.

The mind does not have to BE the brain to be an epiphenomenon OF the brain.

Read some books on complexity theory ('Complexity' by M Mitchell
Waldrop, 'Emergence' by John Holland, 'The Web of Life' by Fritjof
Capra, or 'At Home in the Universe' by Stuart Kauffman, to name some on
my shelf), or Douglas Hofstadter's 'Gödel, Escher, Bach'. Consciousness
and intelligence are most likely inherent in the *patterns* into which
neurons organise themselves, the way they link together and create
feedback loops, rather than in the actual molecular matter of which they
are composed.

This is the theory behind most attempts at creating artificial
intelligence: *what* you are linking together, whether it be nerve cells
or microprocessors, is probably far less important than *how* you link
them together.

--
--Sean
http :// spclsd223.livejournal,com /
'Hey, take it easy on Foreman. He's playing with one lobe tied behind
his back.' --Dr Gregory House

Re: some implications of free will

On Apr 3, 8:02 pm, Sean Carroll <seanc...@hotmail,com > wrote:
> Fred Weiss wrote:
> > But there is no justification for saying that "I am my nervous system"
> > anymore than to say that the mind is the brain. When we die the brain
> > still exists, but the mind is gone.
>
> The mind does not have to BE the brain to be an epiphenomenon OF the brain.

Well, of course it is in some way. The mind cannot function
independent of the brain. I'm just pointing out the difference. For
example, we do not use spatial measurements when referring to the
mind. You would never say that such and such an idea is three inches
away from some other idea or weighs an ounce more or less.

If you were comparing two ideas, what would be the neurochemical
composition of a true idea vs. a false idea? If you could have
monitored Shakespeare's brain, what would have been the neurochemical
difference between his idea of Macbeth vs. Hamlet?

Fred Weiss

Re: some implications of free will

On Apr 2, 4:17 pm, "Fred Weiss" <fredwe...@papertig,com > wrote:
> On Apr 2, 5:19 pm, "Immortalist" <reanimater 2...@yahoo,com > wrote:
>
> > Science has a very strong case with much evidence developed over
> > decades that the activities of your brain alone is enough to
> > completely explain your subjective experience and will.
>
> Science? Does this consist of scientists who have made these cases
> based on the evidence you mention?
>
> Maybe they just had the subjective experience of these cases based on
> the subjective experience of this evidence, in which case there is in
> fact no case or actual evidence.
>
> Not only that but your observation of these supposed strong cases
> which you think are based on much evidence is equally entirely
> subjective.
>

The universal skeptic wishes to
claim truth for a theory that
denies man's ability to arrive
at truth, and this puts the
skeptic in the unenviable
position of uttering
nonsense.

http :// groups.google,com /group/alt.philosophy/msg/b86ea8051203c7f6

> Therefore everything you have just uttered on this subject is utterly
> worthless. Why did you even bother?
>

Sounds like your saying that you cannot take a position on something
and then taking a position. The brains sciences are based upon
empirical and inductive theories not deduction. Your framing the
argument of science as a deductive one, but in reality with theories
you must attack the theory or make better theories that explain more.
The theory that the brain's activities (are) subjectivity gets more
evidence by the day, the counter-theories of a independent-from-the-
brain-soul weaken proportionatly.

> Oh, right, you didn't have any choice and you were just compelled to
> utter it.
>

If it was in line with my desires and goals, memories, and
interpretations, then yes it become compelling.

> Fred Weiss

Re: some implications of free will

On Apr 5, 8:49 pm, "Immortalist" <reanimater 2...@yahoo,com > wrote:

> The theory that the brain's activities (are) subjectivity gets more
> evidence by the day, the counter-theories of a independent-from-the-
> brain-soul weaken proportionatly.

Evidence based on what? Other "subjectivity" or reality? If it's all
subjective, there is no evidence.

You can't have this both ways. You are trying to have your truth,
while denying it, too.

Fred Weiss